Batnitzky, Leora. “Spinoza’s Critique of Miracles.” Cardozo Law Review 25 (2004 2003): 507.

Excerpt:

“It is well known that central to Spinoza’s critique of religious authority is his critique of prophecy. Spinoza’s understanding of prophecy builds on and criticizes Maimonides’ defense of prophecy in his Guide of the Perplexed.  Whereas Maimonides describes the prophet as one who is perfect in intellect and imagination, Spinoza claims that the prophet is talented in the area of imagination alone. Since the prophet only has insight into imaginative happenings, Spinoza claims that the truth of prophecy needs to be confirmed through reason.  For Spinoza, this means that the prophet is by definition not a philosopher and it is the philosophical use of reason that determines the true meaning of prophecy.

Spinoza’s critique of prophecy might seem to be the linchpin of his critique of religious authority for reasons of both content and form. In terms of content, if we accept Spinoza’s description of prophecy, there can be no denying that the prophet’s knowledge is sub-rational (and not, as Maimonides had it, “supra-rational”) and by extension, that claims about revelation are themselves sub-rational. At the same time, Spinoza’s conception of prophecy would seem to encapsulate the form of what is often taken to be the main argument of the Treatise, which is that religion and philosophy are and should be completely separate from one another. ^“

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