Prokhovnik, Raia. “From Democracy to Aristocracy: Spinoza, Reason and Politics.” History of European Ideas 23, no. 2–4 (1997): 105–115. doi:10.1016/S0191-6599(96)00012-5.

Excerpt:

“Several commentators on Spinoza take his famous pronouncements in the
Theologico-Political Treatise I of 1670, that, democracy is ‘the most natural
form of government’ (TTP 263), and ‘of all forms of government the most
natural, and the most consonant with individual liberty’ (TTP 207), along
with his statement in the Political Treatise of 1677 that democracy is ‘the
perfectly absolute dominion’ (TP 385) as the only evidence that is needed to
form an assessment of Spinoza’s estimation of democracy. On the strength of
these pronouncements, such commentators assume that Spinoza was an
uncomplicated advocate of democracy. 2 Even those writers that look more
closely at both of the political treatises written by Spinoza in the 1660s and
1670s, tend to present a confused account of his view of democracy. 3
This paper seeks to understand Spinoza’s conception of democracy more
fully within the context provided by the two texts. This involves highlighting
the crucial roles played by the concepts of reason, liberty and equality in his
political theory, and observing how these concepts affect the character of his
complex notion of democracy. But first it involves correcting the neglect of
serious attention often given to the second of the two political treatises.
While the Political Treatise is often regarded as the less philosophically
important of the two political treatises, 4 there is a strong case for arguing
that it is precisely in the Political Treatise that Spinoza develops the insights
of the Ethics (explicitly invoked TP 289ns, 291ns, 300); whereas as Deleuze
rightly suggests 5 the Theologico-Political Treatise primarily represents
Spinoza’s response to the problem of religion.”

Online:
TandF Online