George Kateb, “Aspects of Rousseau’s Political Thought,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 76, No. 4, (1961) pp.519-43.

Excerpt:

In a review of Sir Isaiah Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty,  which appeared in The Times (London) Literary  Supplement,  the anonymous  writer  complained of the “slanders” that have  been lavished on the political philosophy of Rousseau. The  slanders-and slanders they are-which the writer  had in mind  have come from those who claim to see in Rousseau’s thought  a powerful  and also influential  defense of totalitarianism.  The  fashion  which makes of Rousseau a totalitarian  democrat  must,  of course, be as modern as the word “totalitarian” itself; and  it is J. L. Talmon who has been primarily  responsible for this  kind of attribution  to Rousseau. But there  are slanders against  Rousseau that go back to an earlier time: the view of Rousseau  as a friend of despotism  begins with Constant. Later in the  century,  Taime thought  he saw in Rousseau’s writings  a repellent  theory  of collectivism.

Against these charges,  as we know, Rousseau has had his defenders,  whose strategy  has been to try to show that Rousseau  is not a collectivist,  at all, nor some kind of perverted  democrat,  but an individualist.6 And it would seem hopeless to expect  that the exchange of arguments  for and against Rousseau could  ever be resolved: truces resulting  from fatigue would seem in  fact to be the only resolution. However,  if the issue could some-  how be given a different  complexion; if, somehow,  it could be  shown that both sides are wrong and their battle folly, then  perhaps intolerable debate would be quieted, and Rousseau’s  thought  be allowed a different  perspective. Such an enterprise  is itself  pretentious,  but the pretentiousness  may be forgiven  by  the results. In this  paper, I will try  to show what this enterprise,  in its outlines,  would be.

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