Kant’s Transcendental Idealism

Allison, H., Kant's Transcendental Idealism, revised and expanded version, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.


“In spite of some sympathy shown in recent years for a vaguely Kantian sort of idealism or, better, anti-realism, which argues for the dependence of our conception of reality on our concepts and/or linguistic practices, cots transcendental idealism proper, with its distinction between appearances and things in themselves, remains highly unpopular. To be sure, there has arisen a lively disputes concerning the interpretation of this idealism, with some, myself included, arguing for a version of what is usually called a “2 aspects” review (to be discussed below). Nevertheless, many interpreters continue to attribute to Kant the traditional “2 objects” or “2 worlds” view or some close facsimile thereof, and in most (though not all) cases this reading is combined with a summary dismissal of transcendental idealism as a viable philosophical position. In fact, the manifest the untenability of transcendental idealism, as they understand it, has led some critics to attempt to save Kant from himself, by separating what they take to be a legitimate core of Kantian arguments (usually of an anti-skeptical nature) from the excess baggage of transcendental idealism, with which they believe it to be encumbered.”